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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the implications of preference heterogeneity between wives
and husbands in nonresource-pooling rural West African households for the effect of crop
price changes on agricultural production, i.e., their supply response.  A "semi-
cooperative" game-theoretic model of household decisionmaking, in which household
members make unilateral time and income allocation decisions and negotiate over who
controls these resources, is proposed.  The model is used to show that Pareto efficiency in
both production and consumption do not hold.  It is then employed to simulate the supply
response to cotton price increases accompanying agricultural sector liberalization in
Burkina Faso in the early 1980s.  The simulated semi-cooperative model predicts the
cotton supply response of (monogamous) Burkinabé households to be 25 percent below
that which would ensue in households facing the same production constraints yet whose
members have identical preferences.  The analysis indicates that in nonresource-pooling
agricultural households, preference heterogeneity can be expected to mute supply
response and may do so in a quantitatively significant manner.  It illustrates how an
intrahousehold approach that allows for such heterogeneity and for disaggregation of
resource control by gender contributes to a better understanding of price effects.CONTENTS
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional "unitary" models of household economic behavior have portrayed
households as unified entities in which all members agree, resources are pooled across
members, and Pareto efficiency is achieved (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; Singh, Squire,
and Strauss 1986).  More recently, households across the world have come to be viewed
by economists as consisting of multiple decisionmakers who have possibly differing
preferences and, in many cases, control separate sets of resources.  This approach has
greatly improved understanding of household resource allocation behavior, showing that
heterogeneity among members has implications for a variety of individual, household,
and economy-wide outcomes (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997;  Haddad et al.
1995).  Recent research on West African households, in particular, has demonstrated that
gender-differentiated resource allocation processes in households result in allocative
inefficiencies that reduce overall household production and income (Udry 1996), directly
challenging the assumption of Pareto efficiency.
This paper seeks to provide further understanding of the implications of gender-
based intrahousehold heterogeneity by asking what role it plays in agricultural price
policy impacts.  In particular, it asks: What are the implications of differences in women's
and men's preferences for semi-subsistence agricultural households' production responses
to increased cash crop prices?  Price policies intended to give households incentive to2
increase cash crop production are considered important instruments for accelerating
agricultural and economy-wide growth, reducing poverty, and improving rural people's
well-being.  Development policymakers and researchers therefore have great interest in
how households will react to them.
Conventional wisdom is that the supply response of semi-subsistence developing
country households is positive but weak.  Sitting on the market-nonmarket divide, these
households have historically displayed low responsiveness to price incentives and
opportunities to adopt productivity-enhancing technologies for cash crop production.  
Considerable debate surrounds the underlying causes of this sluggish supply
response.  A substantivist school of economic anthropology attributes it to "peasant"-
specific motives to satisfy only minimum survival needs or ensure "simple reproduction"
rather than to maximize income.  A countering structuralist explanation posits that labor
and food market failures render households dependent on own labor endowments and
home-produced food, constraining their abilities to respond to price incentives (de Janvry,
Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991).  Other supply-response-stifling structural constraints are
thought to be poor infrastructure and technological development, unavailability of
irrigation and productive inputs, missing credit markets, seasonal labor shortages, and
lack of "incentive goods" in the form of industrial consumer products to motivate efforts
to earn cash income (Barrett 1994; World Bank 1991; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and
Sadoulet 1991).  The literature on risk and food security stresses that risk averse
agricultural households may be unwilling to rely exclusively on purchases of food in3
volatile markets to meet their food needs (Chavas 1995).  The associated exposure to
price risk may also weaken supply response (Barrett 1994).
Insights gained from studies of household behavior that take an intrahousehold
approach further deepen the supply response debate.  They reveal that increases in cash
crop prices can alter the opportunity sets of female and male household members
differently.  Price changes bring with them conflict-laden negotiation over who gains the
benefits—in terms of income and the goods it buys—and who bears the costs—in terms
of labor—of increased cash crop production (Whitehead 1990a, 1990b) that may play a
role in stifling households' supply response.  The studies suggest that (1) decisionmaking
in households is not necessarily "joint," and individual control over resources is valued by
household members; and (2) preference heterogeneity between spouses can have real
consequences for changes in households' production, income, and welfare accompanying
change in their economic environments.
This paper brings to bear these new insights from the intrahousehold literature to
the supply response debate.  Section 2 begins with an overview of household decision
models in current usage.  Section 3 then describes rural West African household
decisionmaking in detail to identify a formal model that most accurately captures it. 
Taking the case of Burkinabé households, a "semi-cooperative" game theoretic model is
presented in Section 4.  In Section 5 the model is employed to conduct a simulation
analysis of the supply response to increased cotton prices accompanying agricultural
liberalization in Burkina Faso.  The data employed were collected from 1981 to 1985 in4
southwestern Burkina Faso by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).  Section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
2.  MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING
Models of household decisionmaking can be broken up into two main categories,
unitary and collective (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997).  The unitary model,
rooted in the work of Becker (1974) and expanded to the case of agricultural households
by Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), is the most widely-employed.  Its key assumption is
that household decisions can be described by the maximization of a "household utility
function," whether it represents the common preferences of all members (Samuelson
1956) or those of a benevolent dictator with whom all other household members have an
incentive to agree (Becker 1974).  Any preference differences are either assumed
nonexistent or to be irrelevant.  The time and income of all household members are
pooled: decisions over their allocation are made with respect to the household's total
endowment of resources. 
Collective models are distinguished from unitary models in that preferences of
household members may differ, i.e., intrahousehold preference heterogeneity is allowed
for.  Generally described by economists through game-theoretic models, they may be
broken up into two types: cooperative and noncooperative.  In classical game theory,
cooperative and noncooperative games are distinguished on the basis of two criteria:
(1) the enforceability of agreements among players, and (2) communication among5
players.  While modern theorists argue that enforceability is the more fundamental of the
two criteria (Harsanyi and Selten 1982; Auman 1989), the extent of communication
between players is particularly relevant to the understanding of household
decisionmaking.  In particular, it is useful in distinguishing between decisions made
unilaterally by individual household members, in which communication does not take
place, and those made jointly by household members in which it does.  
The aim of a cooperative game is to resolve players' possibly differing preferences
through communication and eventual agreement.  In this case enforceability is necessary,
for "an ability to negotiate agreements is useful only if the rules of the game make
agreements binding and enforceable" (Harsanyi and Selten 1982).  The most common
cooperative household model is the Nash bargaining model.  In the model, resource
allocation decisions are taken jointly by household members.  The outcome depends on
their relative bargaining powers as determined by their "fallback positions."  Such a
position may be household dissolution (e.g., McElroy and Horney 1981) or some
noncooperative equilibrium within marriage (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak 1993).  All
players have knowledge of all other players' constraints and objectives, i.e., the game is
one of complete information (Harsanyi and Selten 1982). Since resource allocation
decisions, while bargained, are made with respect to the household's entire endowment of
resources, as in the unitary model, all resources are pooled.
In noncooperative games the aim of each player is to maximize their individual
utility in expectation of how other players will behave.  No communication takes place6
between players, so agreement is not reached and the enforceability of agreements is
therefore not necessary.  The players may have restricted knowledge of the constraints the
other players face, making the game one of incomplete information (Harsanyi and Selten
1982).  In these models bargaining power does not matter.  In noncooperative household
models (e.g., Ulph 1988) members control separate sets of resources, i.e., they make
unilateral decisions over the allocation of the resource.  Thus, resources are not pooled.
A defining feature of both unitary and cooperative household models is that they
imply Pareto optimality in both consumption and production (Doss 1996; Udry 1996). 
That is, at the optimum, resources cannot be reallocated to make any member better-off
without making another worse-off, whether through reallocation of income or time
between consumption goods ("Pareto efficiency in consumption") or reallocation of
factors of production to increase income ("Pareto efficiency in production").  Pareto
efficiency does not hold in noncooperative models due to their unilateral, nonresource-
pooling decision structure. 
A final class of models are combination cooperative-noncooperative games, which
allow for some decisions to be made jointly in a negotiation process and others to be
made unilaterally.  This type of flexibility accommodates a wide variety of location-
specific decisionmaking morés that fall in between the extremes of pure cooperative and
noncooperative household models.  The premier in this modeling innovation is Carter and
Katz's (1997) "Separate Spheres model" which, while based in noncooperatively modeled7
 The term "Separateness and Relation" titles Saul's (1989) work on Bobo households of Burkina Faso.
1
 Indeed, claims Collier (1993), the characteristic gender-based division of households into decision
2
units has put Africa at the forefront of the "new economics of viewing household decisions as a bargaining
process" (p. 72).
resource allocation decisions, allows communication and negotiation over transfers of
resources among household members.  
3.  DECISIONMAKING IN RURAL WEST AFRICAN HOUSEHOLDS:
"SEPARATENESS AND RELATION"
1
The models reviewed above differ with respect to assumptions on (1) who makes
decisions; (2) preference heterogeneity; and (3) who controls resources.  Drawing on a
wide literature rooted in studies by anthropologists and economists, this section discusses
West African household decisionmaking to determine which assumptions are appropriate
to the setting.
SEPARATE SPHERES OF DECISIONMAKING 
Broad consensus has been reached that there exists a strong separation within West
African households of husbands' and wives' resource allocation processes.  Married men
and women tend to make day-to-day decisions over the allocation of time, expenditures of
income, and allocation of productive resources individually, in "separate spheres" of
decisionmaking (Guyer 1981, 1988; Whitehead 1990a; Saul 1989).   With respect
2
specifically to agricultural production, such separateness is structured by a widely-8
documented communal-personal dichotomy in income generation.  In communal income-
generating activities, from which the majority of household income is earned, a male
"household head" is the principal decisionmaker and receives any income generated;  all
household members provide labor, including his wife (or wives).  In personal income-
generating activities, individual members are the principal decisionmakers and receive the
income generated; they are also the main source of labor (Whitehead 1990a; Roberts
1988; Davison 1988).  
The separate spheres pattern can also be found in a second major activity taking
place in households, the reproduction and continued maintenance of the physical well-
being of household members.  In West Africa, this includes the birthing and care of
children, food processing and preparation, gathering fuelwood and water, maintaining
cleanliness, purchasing food and medicines, and care of elderly and ill members.  Such
"well-being provisioning" is structured by a gender division of labor and expenditure
responsibilities, with the large majority of the labor being women's (Smith 1995). 
Consonant with a separate spheres nature of decisionmaking, field research has
revealed that wives and husbands in West African households tend to receive cash
income from different sources and to maintain these receipts separately of one another.
Thus, they commonly control subsets of total household income individually.  Income9
 The roots of the separate nature of decisionmaking in West African households—and a transactional
3
rather than "pooled" nature of resources—most probably lie in a social organization in which "rights in people"
(e.g., women and children), polygyny, and marriage as a resource transaction (marked by bride wealth) are
legitimized.  These aspects of African social organization are discussed in Guyer (1981).  Whitehead (1990a)
relates the characteristic separation to pre- "modern transformation" (19th century) patterns in which both
conjugal and kinship relations were important economically.
 Incentive-motivated transfers are distinguished from consumption-motivated transfers in that the latter
4
are made with the intention of facilitating purchases of goods or services for which the transferee is responsible
(Smith 1995).  Examples of the occurrence of incentive-motivated transfers in West Africa are given in
Venema (1986) for the Wolof of Senegal; Funk (1988) for the Brassa of Guinea-Bissau; Babalola and Dennis
(1988) for the Yoruba of Nigeria; Basset (1988) for northern Côte d'Ivoire; Dey (1981), Carney (1988) and
von Braun, Puetz, and Webb (1989) for various ethnic groups in The Gambia; Guyer (1988) for the Beti of
Cameroon; David (1991) for the Kpelle of Liberia; McMillan (1986) for the Mossi of Burkina Faso; and Lilja
et al. (1996) for Malian households.  Note that land for women's personal agricultural production is in some
cases a form of compensation for women's time in communal production (Lilja et al. 1996).
pooling is not the norm;  that is, cash incomes are not generally combined for use in a
single household expenditure plan (Guyer 1988; Fapohunda 1988).    
3
While the separateness of West African spouses' decisionmaking processes is now
well established in the literature, their relatedness has only recently been given attention. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated substantial flows of income between wives and
husbands, many of which are from husbands to wives in compensation for wives' labor in
communal income-generating activities managed by their husbands.  Evidence of the
pervasiveness of these "incentive motivated" transfers, which often arise with the
initiation of cash crop production on communal fields, is mounting.   For the Massa of
4
Cameroon, Jones (1983a, 1983b) provides statistical evidence of their wage-like nature,
finding a significant relationship between husband-wife transfers and the time wives work
on communal fields.  The study concludes that "a  husband's ability to mobilize his wife's
labor for rice production is contingent on the remuneration he gives her" (Jones10
 To understand resource allocation in West African households, a clear distinction between income
5
receipts, income control, and income earnings must be made.  A case where income receipts do not correspond
to earnings is husbands' receipts of income from communal production, which are earned using not only their
own labor, but the labor of other household members as well.
  A fair amount of exchange labor has also been reported in Burkina Faso (Smith 1995).
6
1983b:143). The presence of such remuneration suggests that, while income pooling is
not the norm, neither are spouses' incomes completely separated.   
5
Note that labor and income transactions between spouses are fundamentally shaped
by the existence of incomplete markets for labor.  In the case of Burkina Faso, Fafchamps
(1993) notes the virtual absence of a labor market, making households dependent on their
own members for labor.
6
PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY AND BARGAINING OVER RESOURCE
CONTROL
Husbands and wives in West African households tend to spend income they control
differently, corresponding to gender-specific expenditure responsibilities.  This pattern of
divided expenditure responsibilities is felt to lead spouses to have differing perceptions of
their financial obligations and differing allocative priorities (Fapohunda 1988; Bruce and
Dwyer 1988).  Writes Guyer (1988:160),  "men and women have different spending
preferences, not necessarily because they hold different values but because they are in
structurally different situations."  The literature suggests that women's and men's
preferences are biased relatively more towards goods falling under their own
responsibility.  Their preferences are therefore “heterogeneous."11
Given individualized income control, preference heterogeneity is manifested in
conflict between spouses over who controls income (rather than directly over income
allocation) and, consequently, who earns it.  Recent studies reveal that the changing
income receipts of different household members with the rise of cash cropping in West
Africa over the last century have brought with them conflict-laden negotiation between
husbands and wives not only over income control, but also over wives' labor
contributions to communal production, i.e., control over wives' labor (Whitehead 1990a,
1990b; Guyer 1988, 1989; Roberts 1988).  A quote from a women of the village of
Bwahoun in Burkina Faso captures the conflict between husbands and wives
accompanying the dramatic rise in cotton production there.  She says, "We just want to
make sure that men don't put too much emphasis on cotton at the expense of food crops. 
There is too much work on cotton, and we know that wa nii bi too yensé waari inn,"
which has a literal translation of "our hands are not long in the cotton money" (Mamboué
1991:79).
The outcome of conflict-laden negotiations is determined by the negotiating parties'
relative "bargaining powers."  Bargaining power gives an individual the ability to
influence negotiations with others in the person's own interests.  A person's bargaining
power is influenced by the resources available to them in some "fallback" alternative
living situation (Folbre 1988).  This is because a person who is not dependent on their
relationship with the other negotiating party for access to resources that they need or from
which they benefit is less likely to concede in favor of the other party's interests.  Studies12
of power relations in African households claim that, due to mens' greater access to
productive resources from outside of their household, men have more bargaining power
than women (Stamp 1989).  Research showing women working consistently longer hours
than men (Brown and Haddad 1996) gives supporting evidence for this supposition. 
Thus, in the presence of preference heterogeneity, resource control negotiations are likely
to be settled in favor of men.  
Nevertheless, West African women do appear to have some degree of bargaining
power through viable alternatives to their current marriages, as evidenced in the
frequency of wife-instigated divorce (Funk 1988; Basset 1988).  In Burkina Faso, for
example, divorce rates as high as 50 percent (for the Bwaba) and as low as 10 percent (for
the Mossi) are reported (Kevane and Gray 1996).  The literature on African women
"repeatedly testifies to the fragility of marriage, the causes of which include mistreatment,
polygyny, abandonment or poverty...women who are unduly deprived are likely to
terminate their marriages if they can improve their positions by doing so" (Barnes
1990:259).  Empirical support for the role of bargaining power is given by Lilja et al.
(1996), who estimate that women in Mali who perceive themselves to have the "right to
refuse work" (a proxy for bargaining power) receive a 28 percent higher compensation
rate for their labor in communal production than those who do not.13
THE FAILURE OF PARETO EFFICIENCY 
The character of decisionmaking in rural West African households as described
above, not surprisingly, points to the existence of inefficiencies—from the point of view
of total household resources—in the allocation of resources, i.e., the failure of Pareto
efficiency.  Such inefficiency has long been recognized by anthropologists.  Writes
Lawson (1972:95) quoted in Guyer (1981) of the Ghanian Ewe, "Household expenditure
patterns in Battor certainly demonstrate that the household cannot be considered as a
single unit in which effort and expenditure are directed towards optimizing welfare."  Of
the Hausa in Nigeria, Hill (1972:147) quoted in Guyer (1981) similarly writes that "A
considerable proportion of the wives of the poorest farmers were not in as serious a
predicament as their husbands ... which insulated them to some degree from their
husbands' poverty."
More recently, statistical evidence documenting the failure of Pareto efficiency has
begun to accumulate.  Studies contesting the existence of income pooling in households
(recent ones are reviewed in Haddad 1997) have put first-best consumption efficiency
into question.  Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), for example, find that in Côte d'Ivoire a
higher share of cash income to wives leads to higher expenditures on food and lower
expenditures on alcohol and cigarettes.  Doss (1997), for Ghana, similarly shows that
female asset shares are positively associated with food and education expenditures and
negatively associated with alcohol, recreation, and tobacco expenditures. While these14
 Female-controlled income and assets may affect expenditures through their influence on female
7
bargaining power.  This would be the case regardless of whether income is pooled.
 See examples in World Bank (1987) from Burkina Faso, von Braun, Puetz, and Webb (1989) for The
8
Gambia, and Basset (1988) for Côte d'Ivoire.
results are not definitive evidence against the income pooling hypothesis,  they are
7
consistent with the existence of non-income-pooling behavior. 
With respect to Pareto efficiency in production, the work of Udry (1996) and Udry
et al. (1995), using the ICRISAT data employed in this study, clearly demonstrates that
productive resources in Burkinabé households are not allocated in a Pareto-efficient
manner across agricultural activities.  They find that total household output could be
increased by from 10-20 percent by reallocating currently employed factors of production
across plots controlled by men (including communal plots) and women.  This is a
violation of household income maximization.
What are the implications of the failure of Pareto efficiency for supply response?
While no empirical studies have yet explored this question, preliminary clues can be
culled from studies of changes in resource control and labor allocation in West African
households that have taken place during periods of commercialization over the last
century.  They show that increased cash crop production can bring with it (1) reductions
in women's income receipts and shifts in the distribution of income control in favor of
men (Kennedy and Bouis 1993; Smith 1986) and (2) increased amounts of wives' time
being controlled by their husbands for use in agricultural production (Whitehead 1990a;
Fleuret and Fleuret 1981; Safilios-Rothschild 1985).
815
The changes in labor allocation and income receipts during cotton price
liberalization in Burkina Faso from 1981 to 1985 bear out this pattern.  A 60 percent
cotton price increase over this period was followed by a 50 percent increase in cotton
production and a 136 percent increase in households' cash incomes.  Over the same
period, the average man's income receipts increased by 57 percent while the average
woman's increased by 17 percent (Smith 1995).  Figure 1 relates these gender-
differentiated changes to the rise of cotton production by comparing female and male
labor allocation and income receipts across groups of households producing varying
levels of cotton.  The figure employs the ICRISAT data on which the simulation exercise
below is based.  The survey households are divided into cotton production deciles, with
cotton production increasing across the deciles to the right.  Figure 1a shows that the
more cotton produced, the more is women's labor input and, generally, the less is men's. 
Figure 1b indicates that the more cotton produced, the higher are men's income receipts
and the lower are women's.  The data do not allow a gender breakdown of income control
(although the simulation exercise will).
As discussed in the last section, changes such as those illustrated in Figure 1 have
been accompanied by considerable conflict between wives and husbands.  Given the
nonpooling of income, preference heterogeneity in households creates differing incentives
across household members to allocate increased amounts of their time to the production
of cash crops whose prices have risen.  The incentives depend on who expects to control
any increased income generated.  "Incentive incompatibilities" (Collier 1990) associated 16
Figure 1—Men's and women's time in communal cotton production and cash
income receipts, by cotton production decile in Burkinabé households
(early 1980s)
(1a) Time in communal cotton production (1982/83)
Source: ICRISAT survey data.
(1b) Cash income receipts (1984)
Source: ICRISAT survey data.17
with shifts in resource control distribution can reduce households' overall abilities to
increase cash crop production in response to increased output prices.  In particular,
women's labor, a critical productive input, is not always forthcoming in response to
increased prices of cash crops from which income is received by their husbands (Kabeer
1992; Dey 1997).  The failure of Pareto efficiency thus corresponds to an attenuation of
households' overall supply response.  The attenuation is likely to be more pronounced the
stronger the degree of preference heterogeneity is. 
4. MODEL FOR WEST AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS
The above discussion points to several key characteristics of decisionmaking in
West African households: 
(1) preference heterogeneity between spouses; 
(2) individualized time and income control; 
(3) separate decisionmaking over how time and income are allocated
("unilateral" decisionmaking over resource allocation);  
(4) bargaining over who controls women’s labor and the share of total household
income controlled by each spouse ("joint" decisionmaking over resource
control).  From a practical standpoint, this bargaining is manifested in
negotiations over the time wives spend in communal production and the
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 The extent to which labor markets are present and functioning varies across West Africa.  As
9
mentioned above, labor markets in Burkina Faso, the country on which the empirical portion of this paper
focuses, are virtually absent.
 All production functions, including W[.] below, are assumed continuously differentiable, increasing
10
in all arguments, and strictly quasi-concave.
         (1) 
(5) the absence of a labor market.
9
In this section, these characteristics are incorporated into a formal model and the
implications for allocative efficiency are examined.  The model, which we call a "semi-
cooperative" model, is based on the Separate Spheres model of Carter and Katz (1997). 
This model, as discussed in Section 2, allows for all of the above.
MODEL
While rural West African households are often polygynous and embedded in
extended family compound units, in order to clarify the role of preference heterogeneity
in resource allocation, a two-decisionmaker household, composed of a woman (agent f)
and her husband (agent m)—the decisionmakers—is assumed.  
The household's production technologies are represented by composite functions
for communal (c) and personal (p) production. Communal production takes place of a
partially marketed food crop (cereals), Q , and a fully marketed cash crop, Q given by c1               c2, 
where T  is agent i's time allocated to the production of the j  communal crop and V  is a cj                              cj
i                      th
nonlabor input.   Production functions for agents' personal activities, Q , are given by
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where T , i = f,m is agent i's time allocated to Q  production and V  is a nonlabor input.  p                     p      p
i                     i      i
We assume that the output of all personal production is sold on the market.
The household's well-being provisioning process is given by the function
where W is the level of household physical well-being.  Note that here, W[.] is modeled as
a household production function (Becker 1974).  It is not meant to represent a “welfare”
function, which is generally measured in utility rather than the output of a product or
service.  T  in equation (3) is agent f's time devoted to well-being provisioning, F is w
f
cereals consumed, and the X  are noncereal "well-being inputs" purchased by the agents w
i
at prices p . w
i
The agents' time constraints are given by
where T  = T  + T  is agent i's time in communal production, T  is leisure, and T is a  c    c1    c2                o
i    i    i                i
time endowment.  Let q  and v  be the output and input prices associated with Q [.], cj    cj                  cj
j = 1,2. Let q  and v  be the output and input prices associated with Q [.].  Budget p    p                  p
i    i                  i






















































 Note that, as the decisionmaker for communal production, agent m decides how agent f's time in
11
communal production will be divided between Q  and Q  production.  Thus T  and T  are included in > . c1    c2       c1    c2
f    f        m
(7)
where the X  denote "consumption goods" purchased by agent i at prices p , the E are o                    w
i                    i     i
exogenous incomes, and "t" is a (net) transfer of income from agent m to agent f.  For
convenience, let vectors of prices be given by
The decision variables can be categorized into distinct "decision sets" as follows:
The sets >, i = f,m contain variables over which each agent makes unilateral decisions. 
i
The set > contains "joint" decision variables over which bargaining takes place: the total
j
amount of time agent f spends in communal production (T ) and net income transfer from c
f
agent m to agent f (t),  which together specify a "resource control distribution."
11
To allow for preference heterogeneity, a separate utility function is specified for
each agent.  Preferences are defined over household physical well-being (W),
consumption goods (X ), and leisure (T ).  They are represented by continuously o       o
i       i


















































 Note that the separation of choice into a two-stage process for modeling purposes is not meant in a
12
real-time sequential sense (Katz 1992) but instead signifies a distinction between two qualitatively different
decision modes. In the real world, household members likely take both types of decisions simultaneously.
          (8)
Decisionmaking is modeled as a two-stage game.  In stage one, unilateral resource
allocation decisions are made conditional on resource control distribution >.  This stage is
j
modeled as a noncooperative game in which allocational decisions are made, given
agents' expectations of the other agent's choices.  The noncooperative solution concept
employed is a Nash equilibrium.  In stage two, the agents bargain over > itself in a
j
cooperative bargaining process.  Specifically, the Nash solution for two person bargaining
games with variable threats is employed.   
12
Stage One:  Noncooperative Resource Allocation Decisions
The agents maximize utility, given fixed levels (signified by barred variables) of
the other agent's choice variables and >.  Agent f chooses > to maximize U given fixed >
j          f      f      m
and > subject to equations (3), (4, i = f), and (5).  The Langrangian for her decision
j
problem is
Agent m chooses >  to maximize U , given fixed > and > and subject to equations (1),
m      m       f    j







































































          (9)
    
communal production activities equal T , her total time in communal production.  The c
f
Langrangian for his decision problem is
where exp  is the left-hand side of equation (6).
m
In equations (8) and (9), µ , 8 , i = f,m, and µ  are Lagrange multipliers for the i   i           f
i   i           m
corresponding constraints.  The derivatives of (8) with respect to T  and (9) with respect o
f
to T  yield first order necessary condition (FONC): o
m
The µ  can thus be interpreted as the agents' marginal utilities, or "shadow values," of i
i
consuming their own time in the form of leisure.  From the FONC for consumption
goods, the 8  i = f,m can similarly be interpreted as agents' shadow values of income they i
i
control:
Finally, from the derivative of (9) with respect to T  j = 1,2, shadow values (agent m's) of cj
f
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        (10)
         (11)
Since agent m receives income from communal production, the shadow values are
positively related to his shadow value of income he controls and to the MRP of agent f's
labor. 
  Nash equilibrium values of >  and > are determined through simultaneous solution
m    f
of agents' "reaction functions," given by
The resulting conditional reduced-form equations for the agents' unilateral choice
variables give optimal outcomes for each possible (T , t) combination.  They take the c
f
form
Stage Two:  Cooperative Resource Control Decisions
Indirect utility functions conditional on > serve as the utility metric for choice of >. 
j                  j
They are derived by substituting equation (10) into the agents' direct utility functions (7),
yieldingN(T
f
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         (12)
(13)
         (14)
         (15)
Equation (11) gives the maximum utility each agent can attain at all feasible >
j
combinations.
Agents f and m jointly choose > to maximize a Nash objective function
j
subject to
The Nash objective function is the product of the agents' gains from membership in the
joint decisionmaking unit, i.e., the difference between their current (conditional) utilities
and some fallback position (or "threat point") M.  The fallback positions are defined as
i
marital dissolution and are functions of the prices agents would face in that event, their
exogenous incomes, and nonmonetary variables ", i = f,m that affect their maximized
i
utility in the event of divorce.  They reflect agents' bargaining powers:  the higher is an
agent's fallback position, the stronger that agents' preferences influence joint
decisionmaking.  Equation (13) is an individual rationality constraint specifying that both
agents must be made better-off than they would be in divorce.
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         (16)
        
(17)
        
(18)
Final reduced-form equations for agents' unilateral choice variables in > and >  are
f    m
derived by substituting (14) and (15) into (10), yielding
Equation (16) is an implicit function of agent f's time controlled by each agent (Tc
f
for agent m, T - T  for agent f) and of the income controlled by each (E  - t for agent m, c
f                      m
E + t for agent f), which are endogenous bargained outcomes.  Thus, individual resource
f
control—and the preference heterogeneity and bargaining power divergences that
underlie it—are an important intermediate determinant of the levels of the agents'
unilateral choice variables, including agricultural inputs and outputs.  
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
In the above model, since agent f’s time in communal production is an input into
the household’s income-generating activities, allocative efficiency in income generation
is partially dependent on optimality conditions for resource control.  The FONC for  > is
j
given by the derivatives of (12) with respect to t and T : c
f



































 For the purposes of the present analysis, preference heterogeneity is defined only with respect to the
13
X  and T  and not over well-being itself, in order to avoid making arbitrary assumptions about which agent o    o
i    i
values well-being more than the other and (for the simulation exercise) by exactly how much.  While definitive
quantitative evidence is not available, a wide literature suggests that women "care" more about well-being,
especially that of their children, than men, whether due to gender-specific socialization or expected future
returns (Kabeer 1992; Folbre 1984; Bruce and Dwyer 1988).
        
(19)
        (20)
The agents' marginal rates of substitution (MRS) of t for T  are equated.  In turn, the c
f
MRS's are equated to (the negative of) a ratio of agents' utility gains.  Condition (19)
depends on (1) agents' individual marginal utilities, i.e., on both agents' preferences, and
(2) their fallback positions, which determine the degree to which each agent's preferences
influence the joint decisions.  The marginal utilities are restricted to the following signs
(see Carter and Katz 1997; Smith 1995):
To interpret these conditions, we introduce a specific definition of preference
heterogeneity.  The degree of preference divergence between agents is defined with
respect to the relative values they place on the consumption goods they purchase (i.e., for
which they make income allocation decisions) and their leisure time relative to their
spouse's.   We distinguish among preference homogeneity, heterogeneity, and
13
independence. These are defined at any point > = (>, > , >) as follows:
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Under preference homogeneity, agents fully agree with one another; their MRS's are
identical.  In this case, all signs in equation (20) are zero: the agents are best-off where
the utility of further increments in t and T  can yield them no greater benefit.  Conditions c
f
(17) and (18) are met trivially, condition (19) is undefined, and agents' fallback positions
do not influence the choice of >, with the intuitively appealing result that bargaining
j
power is not a factor in resource control decisions when preferences are homogeneous. 
Under preference heterogeneity (22) and independence (23), agents value the











































        
(24)
        
(25)
In these cases, all signs in equation (20) are strictly non-zero.  Since agent m values goods
and leisure time falling into his decision set (requiring resources controlled by him) more
than those falling into agent f's, he prefers that income transfers be reduced and agent f's
time in communal production be increased.  The opposite holds for agent f.  In this case,
the levels of t and T  that equation (19) implies are dependent on the agents' bargaining c
f
powers: the higher is agent m's fallback position relative to agent f's, the greater will be Tc
f
and the lesser will be t. 
Additional conditions for allocative efficiency in income generation are derived
from equations (8) and (9), the Langrangians for the agents' stage-one problems.  For
agent f’s labor in personal production (from the FONC for  T  in [8]), the condition is p
f
The marginal revenue production (MRP) of her time is equated to a ratio of her shadow
value of her time and income she controls.  For the allocation of her labor between the
communal production activities (from FONCs for T  and T  in [9]), the condition is c1    c2
f    f
Here the MRP of her labor is equated across the activities.  They must also be equated to
























































        
(26)
        
(27)
From the FONCs for T , j = 1,2 and T  (from [9]), optimal allocation of agent m's cj           p
m           m
labor across the communally produced food crop, pure cash crop, and his personal
production activity takes place where the MRP of his labor is equated across the
activities: 
They are equated to a ratio of agent m's shadow values of (his) time and income he
controls.  The efficiency conditions for the allocation of nonlabor inputs are
Together, equation (19)—for resource control—and equations (24) through
(27)—for resource allocation—sum up the efficiency conditions for income generation of
the semi-cooperative model.  Conditions (24) through (27) emphasize the separate nature
of resource allocation decisions, which are governed by the marginal trade-offs felt by
agents individually.  Lack of communication and coordination between agents lead to
lower efficiency than the Pareto efficiency that could be achieved if resources are pooled
and allocated in accordance with a single utility function. Condition (19) emphasizes that
allocative efficiency depends centrally on (is endogenously determined by) the degree of
heterogeneity in agents' preferences and, if agents' preferences are heterogeneous, on their
relative bargaining powers.  In the simulation analysis of the next section, the
implications of this preference heterogeneity for supply response will be explored.30
 Despite the large increase in fertilizer price, the price changes greatly enhanced the profitability of
14
cotton production.  See Savadogo and Wetta (1992) for a full description of the liberalization program.  CFA
francs are those issued by the Communauté Financière Africaine.  The 1982 exchange rate was 325 CFA per
US$1.
 This section gives a broad overview of the parameterization of the simulation model and of the
15
simulation methodology.  A full description can be found in Smith (1995).
5. SIMULATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE LIBERALIZATION IN
BURKINA FASO
Employing the semi-cooperative model above, this section undertakes a simulation
analysis of the production impact of increases in cotton and fertilizer prices that took
place in Burkina Faso from 1982 to 1985 as part of an agricultural price liberalization
program.  Over the period, the price of cotton increased by 60 percent (from 62 to 100
CFA francs).  The price of imported chemical fertilizer increased by 120 percent (from 45
to 100 CFA francs).   Cotton is Burkina Faso's principal cash crop, and it is produced
14
largely as a communal crop (Smith 1995).  The simulation thus examines the impacts of
increases in q  and L  in equation (6).  c2    c2
SIMULATION MODEL AND SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
15
Equations (1) through (6) are parameterized, where possible, using data collected
by the International Crops Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) from
50 households in the cotton belt (the Savanna Guinean agro-climatic zone) of Burkina
Faso (Matlon 1988).  Some parameters that could not be estimated from these data are
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         (29)




To allow variation in preference heterogeneity, a direct utility function approach is
taken; the utility functions (corresponding to equations [7]) employed are Stone-Geary
(Chung 1994), taking the form:
The ('s in equations (30) and (31) can be interpreted as minimum subsistence
requirements for physical well-being, consumption goods, and leisure time, satisfying
and the " are "marginal full-income shares" (Smith 1995).  Concavity of the utility
i
functions is ensured by the following conditions: 
The simulation exercise compares 36 alternative decisionmaking scenarios that differ
along two dimensions: (1) the extent of preference divergence between the agents and
(2) the extent of inequality in their bargaining powers.  A continuum of six preference
divergence cases are considered, denoted "one" (for preference homogeneity), "two,"







































 The agents' marginal full-income shares for well-being are assumed to be equal (see footnote 13).
16
         (34)
        (35)
         (36)
preference independence).  The preference divergence definitions given in equations (21),





Secondary data from West Africa on household-level expenditure shares, income
elasticities, and time allocation are used to estimate full-income shares of physical well-
being (W), consumption goods (X  + X ), and leisure time (T  + T ).  These full-income o    o         o    o
f    m         f    m
shares are used to calculate approximate marginal full-income shares for the aggregated
categories.  Agents f and m are assumed to have the same aggregate marginal shares as
follows: 
The preference divergence cases "one" through "six" are then based on varying values for
agent f's and agent m's marginal full-income shares of consumption goods and leisure
falling in their and the other agent's decision set.  These are given in Table 1.
1633
 For case “six," the fallback positions were calculated for each preference divergence case by
17
manipulating the fallback problem of each agent to yield them a fallback utility level approximately 20 percent
below the actual utility outcomes of the semi-cooperative model.  The manipulated parameters were agent m’s
fallback endowments of labor (which he may receive, for example, from other wives, his siblings or his
brother’s wives) and both agents’ fallback exogenous incomes.  For the other cases, agent m’s fallback utility
level was held constant, and agent f’s fallback utility was allowed to decrease progressively until it reached her
subsistence minimum level in case “a." 
Table 1—Marginal full-income shares for agents' Stone-Geary utility functions
across preference divergence cases 
Preference  Preference heterogeneity Preference
homogeneity _____________________________________________ independence
 one two three four five six
i=f,  i=m i=f,  i=m i=f,  i=m i=f,  i=m i=f,  i=m i=f,  i=m
" "w
i .2 , .2 .2 , .2 .2 , .2 .2 , .2 .2 , .2  .2 , .2
" "xf
i .15 , .15 .18 , .12 .21 , .09 .24 , .06 .27 , .03 .3 , 0
" "xm
i .15 , .15 .12 , .18 .09 , .21 .06 , .24 .03 , .27   0 , .3
" "Tf
i .25 , .25 .3 , .2 .35 , .15 .4 , .1 .45 , .05  .5 , 0
" "Tm
i .25 , .25 .2 , .3 .15 , .35 .1 , .4 .05 , .45    0 , .5
Within each of the preference divergence cases are embedded six relative
bargaining power (BP) cases, denoted "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," and "f."  In case a, agent m
has much greater BP than agent f.  In cases b through e, BP gradually becomes more
equal.  In case f, the agents' bargaining powers are approximately equal.  The BP cases
are operationalized through simulating the agents' fallback optimization problems.  
17
In sum, the scenarios range from "(one,a)," in which agents' preferences are
homogeneous and BP is greatly in favor of agent m, to "(six,f)," in which preference
independence prevails and agents have relatively equal BP.  The only difference across
the scenarios is the parameterization of the utility functions and the agents' fallback utilityln(Qc1) ’ 2.96%0.457 ln(Tc1)%0.424 ln(Ac1) R 2’0.589
(7.4) (7.1).
ln(Qc2) ’ 2.18%0.59 ln(Tc2)%0.29 ln(Ac2)%0.12 ln(Fc2)&0.0045 ln(Fc2)2.
34
levels.  The agricultural production functions, well-being provisioning function, and
constraints on time and income for each scenario are identical. 
For the communal production activities, Cobb-Douglas food (Q ) and cotton (Q ) c1       c2
production functions are estimated using the ICRISAT survey data.  A food production
function is estimated for 470 plots of millet, red sorghum and white sorghum using
ordinary least squares estimation and inputs of land (A ) and labor (T ).  The estimated c1       c1
function is (t-statistics are in parentheses)
Constant returns to scale is imposed for simulation purposes, giving a labor coefficient of
0.472 and a land coefficient of 0.528.
It is not possible to estimate a cotton production function directly from the
ICRISAT data due to lack of plot-level data on cotton output.  Instead, Cobb-Douglas
coefficients on labor (T ), land (A ), and chemical fertilizer (F ) (the latter used almost c2     c2         c2
exclusively in cotton production), are estimated employing efficiency conditions for
communal production (see equations [28], [30] and [31]) and average input-output ratios
for food and cotton estimated from the ICRISAT data.  The function is modified to allow
for both positive and negative marginal returns to chemical fertilizer.  The resulting








 Udry (1996), using a larger set of the ICRISAT data, estimates a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
18
production function containing female and male labor as inputs.  He finds them to be equally productive.
  Due to limitations on the number of equations in the nonlinear model being simulated and to the
19
diverse mix of personal production activities in which both men and women engage in Burkina Faso, it was
neither possible nor desirable to estimate aggregated personal production functions for each agent.  Instead,
each agent's time in personal production is assumed to be remunerated at an exogenous hourly rate.  These rates
were the only unknown parameter in the system of estimating equations to be simulated.  Thus they were
chosen using controlled experiments to conform to the profile laid out in Table 2 (Smith 1995).   
Male and female labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes in both food and cotton
production.
18
The well-being provisioning function [3] is specified as Stone-Geary in order to
allow for subsistence minimums.  It is
The subsistence minimums ($s) for cereals and time are established using World Health
Organization standards and women's time allocation data collected in Burkina Faso.
The simulation model allows for four pervasive features of the semi-arid Sahelian
West African production environment.  These are seasonality in income-generating
activities, precautionary cereal market reliance and a "cereal code of honor" sanctifying
the use of home-produced cereals for home consumption (McCorkle 1989), and cereal
and cash income savings and flows across years.  In order to capture the resource
allocation behavior of a two-decisionmaker unit, the base cases of the 36 scenarios are
targeted as closely as possible to the resource availabilities and production behaviors of
the monogamous households participating in the ICRISAT survey.   Table 2 presents an
1936
agricultural production profile of these households, which make up 36 percent of the
survey households.
Table 2—Features of monogamous Burkinabé households' production behavior
targeted for base cases
Output-land ratio Output-labor ratio Labor-land ratio Fertilizer
(kg/ha) (kg/hrs) (hrs/ha) (kgs)
Food 435.9 .726 600 -
Cotton 813.8 .644 1264 124
Market reliance for food:  17.5 percent
Source: ICRISAT data, average of 1982 and 1983 survey rounds. 
The simulations are undertaken using the nonlinear mathematical programming
solver MINOS in GAMS.  The first stage noncooperative resource allocation game, in
which t and T  are held fixed, is programmed using an iterative algorithm.  Specifically, c
f
within each agent's unilateral choice problem, the variables falling in their decision sets
are chosen to maximize utility, holding those falling into the other agent's decision set
fixed.  Upon solution of an agent's optimization problem, the optimal values of their
choice variables replace the fixed levels in the other agent's problem, which is then solved
for that agent's choice variables.  The process is repeated until convergence, when agent
f's and agent m's problems yield consistent choices.  The solution for the entire two-stage
game is found through a grid search over the noncooperative outcomes associated with
fixed levels of t and T  for that (t, T ) combination yielding the maximum Nash c        c
f        f37
  A wide range of combinations of the variables T  (in units of 5 hours) and t (in units of 500
20                   f
c
CFA) are considered.
product.   At this point (1) agents' unilateral choice problems (mimicking the crossing of
20
their reaction functions) are consistent with one another, and (2) the Nash cooperative
bargaining solution for t and T  is reached, thus solving the semi-cooperative game for all c
f
endogenous variables.
A base case validation exercise finds that, within the behavioral framework
assumed, scenario (six,d), a scenario of high preference heterogeneity and in which agent
f has a fairly high degree of bargaining power (yet lower than agent m's) lies closest to the
reality of monogamous households in Burkina Faso.  The criteria used are consistency
with the targeted production data in Table 2 and with ratios of women's to men's time in
communal production, leisure time and income receipts. 
PRE-LIBERALIZATION RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND CONTROL 
First consider optimal base case resource control distribution across the 36
scenarios.  Pre-price-change levels of agent f's time in communal production (T ) and c
f
income transfers (t) are reported in Table 3.  In the BP cases for which relative BP is
greatly in favor of agent m (a to d), as we move across preference divergence cases "one"
through "six," T  tends to increase.  Where relative BP is more balanced (e and f), it c
f
generally decreases as preference heterogeneity increases.  The optimal income transfer
decreases monotonically as preference heterogeneity increases for all BP cases.38
Table 3—Base case levels of agent f's time in communal production (t ) and income  c
f
transfers (t) across scenarios
Preference Preference Preference
Bargaining power (BP) homogeneity heterogeneity  independence
one two three four five six
T  (hours per year) c
f
BP greatly favors m   (a) 710 690 700 780 936 1,260
BP moderately favors m
  (b) 700 685 700 745 880 1,165
  (c) 705 680 680 715 815 1,065
  (d) 705 670 655 670 750 840
   (e) 685 650 635 650 695 675
BP about equal    (f) 690 640 615 615 605 495
t (1,000s of CFA)
BP greatly favors m   (a)    46 42.5 38.5 31.5 17.5    -8
BP moderately favors m
  (b) 46.5 43.5 39.5   33   21    -2
  (c) 46.5 43.5    41   35   25     5
  (d)   47 44.5 41.5   37   29 10.5
  (e)   46 44.5 42.5 39.5   34 18.5
BP about equal   (f)   47   45   44   42 38.5   28
Holding the degree of preference heterogeneity constant, as relative BP ranges from
being greatly in favor of agent m (case a) to relatively equal (case f) T  declines and t c
f
increases, illustrating the greater control agent f has over her time and household income
as her fallback position is improved.  Figure 2 traces out the optimal levels of t
(horizontal axis) and T  (vertical axis)—the optimal resource control contract—for the c
f
scenarios.  Under preference independence the contract varies greatly depending on the
agents' BPs.  Under preference homogeneity, it is essentially the same no matter what the
agents' BPs are.
Simulated base case levels of cotton production, associated inputs, and income




















































































































































































































































Figure 2—Simulated base-case contract curves for labor and income transfers in Burkinabé households, alternative
scenarios
Source: Simulation results.40
  This number can be compared with the 10-20 percent increase in output that could be achieved in
21
Burkinabé households by reallocating existing factors of production estimated by Udry et al. (1996).  These
numbers are not strictly comparable because that estimated in this paper refers to total household income
whereas the Udry et al. number refers to agricultural production only.  Additionally, the results in this paper
are based on monogamous households only while those in the Udry et al. analysis are based on all household
types.
spouses' relative bargaining power in Burkinabé households, are given in Table 4.  Cotton
production tends to increase slightly as preference heterogeneity increases.  This increase
is associated with an overall increase in agent f's labor (and an overall decline in agent
m's), reflecting the greater value agent m places on agent f's labor in income generation
(rather than her leisure) as preferences diverge.
Agent f's income control declines as preference heterogeneity increases, while agent
m's increases.  Total household income decreases across the preference divergence cases,
indicating that the deviation from Pareto efficiency in income generation caused by the
nonpooling of resources increases as preference heterogeneity increases.  Case six—that
producing the least error when judged against actual behavioral patterns in monogamous
Burkinabé households—represents a 16,200 CFA reduction in income over case one, in
which the preferences of household members are assumed identical.  In other words, total
resources controlled within the household could potentially be reallocated to increase its
income by 9 percent.
21
SIMULATED SUPPLY RESPONSE RESULTS
Table 5 reports the predicted effects of the price increases on cotton production for
preference divergence cases "one" through "six," relative bargaining power case d.  41
Table 4—Base-case cotton production and income,  preference divergence cases 
"one" to "six," bargaining power moderately in favor of agent m (case
"d")
Preference  Preference
homogeneity Preference heterogeneity independence
one two three four five  six
Cotton (kilograms) 1,071 1,099 1,119 1,132 1,138 1,131
       labor (hours) 1,305 1,336 1,358 1,373 1,379 1,371
         agent f 299 292 291 302 340 378
         agent m 421 441 452 448 413 371
       land (hectares) 1.24 1.29 1.32 1.34 1.35 1.34
       fertilizer (kilograms) 133 135 137 139 139 139
Income (1,000s CFA) 193.8 192.7 191.1 188.3 182.7 177.6
     f: receipts 11.0 12.0 13.3 15.3 18.9 28.6
     f: control 58.0 56.5 54.8 52.3 47.9 39.1
     m: receipts 117.5 115.5 113.5 110.8 106.7 96.2
     m: control 70.5 71.0 72.0 73.8 77.7 85.7
Note: Total labor in cotton production includes the labor of other household members and nonhousehold exchange
labor.  Total income includes cash income plus the value of food produced and consumed in the  household,
while individual agents' incomes refer only to cash income.
Table 5—Impact of price increases on cotton production and income, preference
divergence cases "one" to "six," bargaining power moderately favoring
agent m (case "d") ( percent change over base)
Preference Preference
homogeneity Preference heterogeneity independence
one two three four five  six
Cotton (kilograms) 56.7  52.0 48.9 43.4 41.5 40.3
     labor (hours) 73 67 62 57 54 53
     land (hectares) 45 41 38 34 33 32
     fertilizer (kilograms) 24 20 17 14 13 12
Income (1,000 CFA) 40 39 37 35 39 42
       f: receipts -100 -100 -100 -88 -60 -35
       f: control 45 43 39 24 29 23
     m: receipts 53 53 53 51 50 54
     m: control 35 35 34 35 36 3842
  Note that the case of preference homogeneity is not equivalent to the unitary household model since
22
the models’ underlying structures are different.  In particular, despite the fact that the spouses may agree with
each other, their unilateral decisionmaking restricts them from reaching the type of cooperative solution that
could be obtained in a traditional unitary (or even cooperative game-theoretic) model.  
 See Smith and Chavas (1997) for treatment of how the balance of women's time between well-being
23
provisioning and income-generating activities is affected by the price changes.
Cotton production is predicted to increase in all cases.  However, the percentage increase
declines from 56.7 percent under preference homogeneity to 40.3 percent under
preference independence.  Underlying this decline are reductions in the percentage
increase in labor (from 73 percent in case "one" to 53 percent in "six") and all other
inputs.  The simulation model thus predicts that supply response decreases as preference
heterogeneity increases.  The increase in cotton production over the four years under
scenario (six, d) is 456.2 kilograms; the increase under scenario (one, d) is 607.5
kilograms.  Thus, the simulation model predicts the cotton supply response under
preference heterogeneity of monogamous Burkinabé households to be 25 percent below
that for households employing the same technology and facing the same resource
limitations but whose members have identical preferences.   
22
Table 5 also reports the effects of the price increases on income.  Cash income
received by agent f declines to zero in cases one through three, i.e., agent f no longer
engages in personal income generation after the price change.   As preferences diverge
23
more, her personal income receipts decline more slowly:  agent f continues to engage in
activities from which she receives income, even though communal production has
become more remunerative.  With respect to income control, as preferences diverge more,43
 Udry (1996) proposes that the roots of the inefficient allocation of resources in Burkinabé households
24
lies in a number of impediments to mutually advantageous trades between members.  The first set of
impediments is imperfect labor, land, and asset rental markets.  The second set of impediments are
(intrahousehold) labor market “transactions costs” associated with imperfect information and conflicts over
the extent of wives’ contributions to husbands’ activities.  The latter, as pointed out in this paper, is itself
rooted in substantial differences in the preferences of husbands and wives.  Footnote 3 gives further insight
into why inefficiencies persist in the fact of gains from alternative arrangements.  
 Recall that the price increases lead to an increase in agent m's fallback position and leave agent f's
25
unchanged (see equation [12]).  Thus after the price change, the balance of bargaining power shifts in favor
of agent m across the five cases of preference heterogeneity.  Smith (1998) shows how this shift affects the
price impacts separately from their direct feasibility effects.
the percentage increase in income controlled by agent f declines.  Thus, the greater is
preference heterogeneity, the more income control distribution shifts in favor of agent m,
and the less is agent f's incentive to increase her time in communal production.  These
trends illustrate how preference divergences drive incentive incompatibilities between
spouses, in turn reducing households' overall supply response.
24
Figure 3 maps out the predicted increase in cotton production across all 36
scenarios.  The highest percentage increase occurs under preference homogeneity; the
lowest occurs in scenario (six, f), in which preference independence prevails and agents'
BPs are relatively equal.  Note that, as for the base-case resource control contract,
bargaining power matters little for price impacts when agents' preferences are
homogenous; its influence becomes more pronounced as preferences diverge.
25
Figure 4 shows how cotton production is predicted to evolve over time under each
of the six preference divergence cases as prices are progressively increased (in equal
amounts) over the four years of the study period.  Each line gives the average of the BP
cases making up each preference divergence case.  Figure 5 links the increases in cotton 44
Figure 3—Simulated cotton supply response of Burkinabé households, alternative
scenarios
Figure 4—Simulated impact of price increases on cotton production in Burkinabé
households, 1981–1985, alternative scenarios45









production with changes in resource control distribution in households.  While both
wives’ and husbands’ time in communal production increases over the four years (Figure
5a), husbands' income receipts are predicted to increase while wives' are predicted to
decrease (Figure 5b).  Figure 5c shows husbands' income control increasing at a faster
rate than wives, consistent with the studies claiming that increased cash crop production
leads to increased inequality in income control distribution within households.
6.  CONCLUSION 
The principal conclusion of this paper is that in nonresource pooling, West African
agricultural households preference heterogeneity between women and men mutes supply
response.  For preference heterogeneous monogamous households of Burkina Faso, the
simulation analysis predicts a 25 percent lower cotton supply response than would be the
case if household members' preferences were identical, suggesting that the effect of
intrahousehold preference heterogeneity may be quite significant quantitatively.  It can
thus be added to the list—along with market failures, poor infrastructure, and risk
aversion—of potential "structural" constraints to agricultural supply response in West
Africa. 
The paper illustrates how an intrahousehold approach can contribute to a better
understanding of microeconomic allocation decisions and policy impacts.  For the West
African setting in particular, it has shown that price policy impacts depend on the manner
in which individuals in households—rather than households as a whole—respond to price47
changes.  This response in turn depends on how the changes are likely to affect resource
control distribution within households, which is influenced by individuals' ability to
bargain with other household members over the benefit (and cost) streams flowing from
the changes.  We hope that by taking these realities into account, policies designed to
improve supply response will be both more effective at reaching this goal and more
beneficial to households and all individuals in them.  We also hope that this research will
stimulate further exploration of intrahousehold behavior and its implications for empirical
analysis and policy prescriptions. REFERENCES
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